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21. Introduction 
Ever since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the free movement of persons, capital, services and 
goods have been strongly emphasized as fundamental components of economic and social 
integration in Europe. Like other industries, however, electricity markets in Europe have 
historically developed based on independent national systems. The three Energy Packages 
(1996, 2003 and 2009) show the permanent effort of the European Commission (EC) to change 
national electricity markets toward a competitive European internal electricity market. 
Depending on the respective country, independent regulatory authorities and independent 
transmission system operators have been established, privatization and liberalization has taken 
place, existing vertically integrated companies have been (legally or fully ownership) 
unbundled, incentive regulation schemes have been introduced, renewables got integrated in 
national markets, national/regional power exchange markets have been established, market 
coupling1 has been regionally introduced, and transmission capacities as well as interconnection 
capacities have been increasing. Thus, a lot of effort has been put into establishing integrated 
markets, and this paper asks what the status of integration in electricity markets is by testing 
the main predictions of trade theory. 
Although there is no lack of empirical evidence on integration and price convergence 
(see Zachman, 2008; Böckers et al., 2013; Gugler et al., 2016), fairly little is known about the 
drivers of integration and price convergence between two adjacent electricity markets in 
Europe. In contrast to other commodities, electricity moves freely between two adjacent 
markets in a certain hour, while in the next hour it may face trade barriers that hinder full price 
convergence and market integration (see Gugler et al., 2016). This paper attempts to explicitly 
address this issue by examining the impacts of generation mixes, trade with third countries and 
interconnection2 capacity between Germany3 and France on spot price spreads as well as 
congestion4 probabilities between Germany and France. Like Keppler et al. (2016), we consider 
our dependent variables price spread and interconnection capacity congestion to be good 
indicators of integration of two adjacent electricity markets. Our rich dataset uses hourly data 
from 01.04.2011 to 31.12.2014 for generation mixes, electricity spot prices, load, 
1 Market coupling entails simultaneous auctioning of available transfer capacity and electricity. Hence, it
promotes efficient allocation of interconnector capacity.
2 Interconnections are electric power transmission (transportation) lines that enable movement of electricity
from country A to country B.
3 Since Germany and Austria constitute one spot market‐pricing zone, we refer to this pricing zone as Germany.
4 Congestion of interconnection capacities takes place when demand for electricity trade exceeds
interconnection capacity. As a result, prices diverge (price spreads increase) and thus full price convergence
cannot be achieved.
3interconnection capacity, wind, solar and nuclear electricity. We look at German and French 
electricity markets because they together account for nearly 40% of the EU-28 total electricity 
generation in 2014 (Eurostat, 2014) and they also play a central role in the process of European 
electricity market integration regarding the fact that they are interconnected with 13 other 
European electricity market areas5. This paper employs a very rich dataset to empirically show 
that convergence of German and French electricity spot market prices depends not only on the 
trade (export/import) capacity between the two countries, and on the characteristics of 
neighbouring markets (like Italy and Denmark), but also on the employed generation mix 
structures. A feature of electricity markets is that in certain hours two neighbouring electricity 
markets may employ either different or similar generation technologies to meet their domestic 
demands and export needs. Moreover, the similarity/dissimilarity may change from hour to 
hour. The novelty of this paper is the construction of a generation mix similarity index (GMSI) 
for German and French electricity markets following Jaffe (1986). The GMSI between the 
German and French merit orders (i.e. supply curves) up to their intersection with their demand 
curves is a measure of how similar their generation mixes are in a certain hour. 
Our first main result is that the law of one-price (i.e. no cross-border congestion) 
between Germany and France occurs only in those hours where generation mixes are fairly 
similar. In contrast, there is excess demand for interconnection capacities and price divergence 
in those hours where generation structures are dissimilar. Regarding convergence of European 
electricity markets, this implies that at least part of the convergence that is documented in the 
literature6 is spurious, because it is not (only) driven by the forces of arbitrage, but by the 
similarity of the generation structures. In this regard, integration of two adjacent electricity 
markets that employ different generation technologies provide greater security of electricity 
supply in the event that one kind of generation technology becomes limited. In addition, market 
integration ensures access to a more diversified power plants’ portfolio, which in turn helps to 
improve the reliability of the electricity system through reducing the cost of maintaining 
capacity adequacy. 
As a result, we have identified two problems. First, according to standard trade theory 
(see e.g. Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Matsuyama, 2000), the benefits of cross-border trade 
and diversification of the electricity generation portfolio (like less need of a large reserve 
5 Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, Denmark (East andWest), United
Kingdom, Netherlands and Belgium.
6 See e.g. Gugler et al. (2016); Keppler et al. (2016); Pellini (2012); Nepal & Jamasb (2012); Nitsche et al. (2010);
Zachmann (2008); De Vany & Walls (1999).
4margin7 or outright capacity markets8 (UN, 2006; OECD/IEA, 2014)) are largest exactly when 
Germany and France employ dissimilar generation mixes. However, exactly in those hours 
congestion of interconnection capacities mostly occurs, and the gains from trade cannot be 
obtained. Second, as documented by our index measuring similarity of generation structures 
(GMSI), generation structures in Germany and France have become more dissimilar in recent 
years. Enormous investment in renewables generation capacities (wind and solar) paralleled by 
the nuclear phase-out (only) in Germany have made generation mixes less similar compared to 
its neighbour France. Thus, full price convergence and the benefits of diversification can only 
be achieved by additional investment in cross-border capacity. 
Moreover, we are able to empirically distinguish different impacts of nuclear, wind and 
solar generation, load and trade with third countries on market integration depending on the 
direction of interconnection capacity congestion9. The argument that wind and solar electricity 
generation in Germany is making the two largest electricity markets in Europe, German and 
French electricity spot markets, less integrated (e.g. Keppler et al., 2016) does not necessarily 
hold, since their effect on integration depends primarily on the direction of interconnection 
capacity congestion. E.g., when France exports to Germany, additional wind and solar 
generation in Germany would decrease the likelihood of interconnection capacity congestion. 
We also show that price spreads and the likelihood of congestion between adjacent 
market pairs heavily depend on the influences coming from neighbouring markets. Regarding 
the fact that Germany mostly exports to France10 and France mostly exports to Italy11, 
increasing interconnection capacity between France and Italy increases price spreads between 
Germany and France and congestion probabilities from Germany to France. This occurs 
because additional exports to Italy increase prices in France and thus increase price spreads to 
Germany further leading to higher imports from Germany to achieve price equality, which in 
turn may exceed interconnection capacities. Likewise, wind electricity in Denmark strongly 
affects the probabilities of interconnection congestion between Germany and France in the same 
7 A countrys reserve margin measures the difference between the peak electricity generating capacity and the
peak demand (Joskow, 2007). Countriesmostly hold reserve electricity generation capacities to respond to short‐ 
and long‐run outages (e.g. overnight solar electricity, hydroelectricity in a year with little rainfall, etc.) and thus
ensure security of electricity supply.
8 Capacity markets remunerate electricity firms for holding available generation capacity and not only for actually
producing and delivering electricity.
9 Electricity flows either from Germany to France or from France to Germany. As a result, interconnection
capacities can be congested only in one direction (this holds only for electricity markets that have implemented
market coupling (see Gugler et al., 2016)).
10 So that most of the time the price in Germany is lower than the price in France   .
11 So that most of the time the price in Italy is higher than the price in France   .
5way as own (i.e. German) wind electricity does. Therefore, our second main result is that 
externalities from cross-border trade matter for European electricity markets and, as such, 
deciding for pure national energy policies to solve main problems such as integration of 
renewables and security of supply may not work. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature to date and the 
actual developments in European electricity markets. In section 3, we discuss generation mix 
similarities and integration of adjacent electricity markets and describe the construction of the 
generation mix similarity index (). Data and variables are described in section 4. Our 
empirical strategy is described in section 5. The main empirical findings are presented in section 
6. Finally, conclusions are in section 7. In the Appendix we show how we have developed a 
state-of-the-art (standard) fundamental market model of electricity supply, which we use in 
building the generation mix similarity index (). 
2. Literature review on internal European electricity markets 
This section discusses the relevant empirical literature on the integration of electricity markets 
and the factors that interfere with it. The literature is mainly concentrated on assessing the 
degree of integration of European electricity markets (e.g. Da Silva & Soares, 2008; Zachmann, 
2008; Böckers et al., 2013). Besides, some studies assess the impacts of certain national energy 
policies on the integration of European electricity markets. Eventually, we shortly discuss the 
difficulties in establishing internal European electricity markets coming from different national 
energy policies regarding the actual developments in promoting renewable technologies and 
implementation of capacity remuneration mechanisms. 
Gugler et al. (2016) point out that market integration increased from 2010 to 2012, 
however partly due to increased feed-in from intermittent renewables then decreased until 2015. 
In addition, they find that the efficiency of integration (measured by speeds of price adjustment) 
is quite modest. Additional investment in interconnection capacities and further promotion of 
market coupling would have a positive and significant impact on the integration of European 
electricity markets. 
Keppler et al. (2016) use hourly data for German wind and solar electricity and French 
nuclear generation from November 2009 until June 2013, and assess their impact on the 
convergence of German and French spot prices and on the congestion of interconnection 
capacities. Additional wind and solar electricity in Germany increases the likelihood of 
6interconnection congestion and thus leads to more price divergence, while nuclear generation 
in France has the opposite effect. However, the study does not consider the direction of 
congestion – which is an asset of our paper. 
Regarding national unilateral policies from EU member states, Grossi et al. (2015) have 
investigated the impacts of the German nuclear phase out and expansion of renewables due to 
fixed feed-in tariffs on neighbouring countries’ energy markets. They found that nuclear phase 
out caused a price increase in neighbouring spot prices of up to 19% while renewable energy 
generation caused a price decrease of up to 0.17% for each percent of additional generation 
from German renewables. This underlines the importance of a coordinated approach of 
European energy policy in an increasingly integrated European electricity market (Phan & 
Roques, 2015). 
 Gianfreda et al. (2016) show that a high share of renewable energy generation has 
decreased the long-run dependence of electricity from gas and coal prices. In addition, they 
show that EU member states are becoming less integrated as the share of renewable energy 
generation increases. This in turn would call for a more coordinated policy at the EU level in 
promoting renewable energy sources, which also should be in accordance with the process of 
establishing internal energy markets. 
European Energy Packages (Directive 96/92/EC, Directive 2003/54/EC, Directive 
2009/72/EC) adopted over the last two decades show the constant efforts and ambitions of the 
EU to establish one single European electricity market and a decarbonized European electricity 
supply. Therefore, investments took place in reducing interconnection capacity limitations in 
order to support market integration. In this context, the EC has identified energy infrastructure 
priorities for 2020 and beyond and has suggested guidelines for the development of a European 
energy infrastructure (EC, 2011). 
Generally, EU member states employ quite different structures regarding their 
electricity generation mix. Following the aim of decarbonising electricity supply (Directive 
2009/28/EC) many countries have introduced diverse support schemes to promote renewable 
technologies. Wind and solar generation capacity deployments are highly concentrated in some 
EU member states, such as Germany, Spain and Great Britain. These countries account for 56% 
of the total wind generation in the year 2014, while Germany, Italy and Spain account for 78% 
of the total solar generation (ENTSO-E, 2015). Contrary to the German nuclear phase-out in 
2011 after Fukushima, some EU member states like France, Finland, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria 
7and Romania still have nuclear power plants under construction (EC, 2015). This shows the 
divergences driven by different national energy policies across EU member states. 
Although an integrated European electricity market would ensure better security of 
electricity supply, governments still drive national energy policies relating to security of 
electricity supply (Grigorjeva, 2015). Since energy-only markets provide inefficient price 
signals for long-term investments if heavily distorted by national low-carbon policies, many 
EU member states have implemented different capacity remuneration mechanisms12 (Ellenbeck 
et al., 2015). The introduction of these mechanisms in several EU member states obviously 
shows that some countries have selected an isolated approach in addressing concerns relating 
to security of electricity supply, even though security of electricity supply has become at least 
a regional issue (Eurelectric, 2016). In this respect, Booz & Co (2013) have pointed out that 
national-based approaches to ensure security of supply will cost EU member states between €3-
7 Billion per year. Moreover, these may (1) impact changes in the composition of generation 
mixes across EU member states, (2) create institutional barriers for market integration and, thus, 
represent a considerable risk in achieving European integrated electricity markets and (3) cause 
different market distortions, such as hampering competition (Zgajewski, 2015; Mastropietro et 
al., 2015). In the next section, we assess the main determinants of electricity market integration 
in Europe. 
3. Generation mix similarities and market integration between 
neighbouring markets 
In this section, we graphically illustrate the intuition behind the impact of the structure of 
generation mixes of two adjacent markets on spot price spreads. Note that electricity is a 
homogenous good in terms of its physical properties. Besides, we assume that electricity spot 
markets operate under conditions of perfect information and thus work efficiently (Graf & 
Wozabal, 2013). Graph 1 illustrates actual generation capacities data ordered according to the 
marginal costs of production by generation technology13 in market  (let us call it France) and 
neighbouring market  (Germany). At first sight, both markets appear to have relatively 
different generation mixes, since nuclear and water power plants make up almost 70% and 20% 
of total generation capacities of market , respectively, while in market  over 40% and 50% 
12 Belgium, Finland, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
13 All types of renewables (wind, solar, geothermal, pellets, etc.), hydro, nuclear, coal, gas and oil power plants.
8of total generation capacities are  renewables (wind and solar) and coal, respectively.14 That is, 
market  has quite a flat merit order curve based on the high share of water and nuclear 
capacities, which becomes very steep at the end due to a low share of peak-load technologies 
with high marginal costs. On the other hand, the flat section of the merit order curve in market 
 strongly depends on the level of intermittent renewable generation, while the second part is 
relatively steep because of the high share of coal and then gas power plants. 
[Graph 1] 
In Graph 1, we depict markets  and  with equal national demand schedules 
(  		  ). In both periods, peak and off-peak, and under 
autarky the price in market  is lower than in market  (  		 
). Note that when demand peaks price spreads between markets  and  become smaller 
(∆  ∆)15, if generation technologies become more similar. If trade between 
markets  and  is supported only with limited interconnection capacity, interconnection 
capacity congestions (and price spreads) are less likely to occur when demand peaks, since 
generation mixes turn out to be more similar, than in off-peak periods, where generation mixes 
are less similar (see also Mutreja et al., 2014). Accordingly, besides demand levels, generation 
mix similarities and interconnection capacities determine the likelihood of interconnection 
capacity congestion and the level of price spreads in the presence of increasing marginal cost 
(=supply) schedules and limited interconnection capacities. Note that this kind of 
"convergence" is not (only) driven by the forces of arbitrage, but by the increased similarity of 
the generation mix which happens to occur in peak periods. Therefore, we view this kind of 
convergence at least in part as spurious. 
GMSI 
 In order to measure the similarity of generation structures between German and French 
electricity markets we follow Jaffe (1986)16 and construct the generation mix similarity index 
14 Renewables and hydro power plants with essentially zero marginal costs and nuclear power plants with
relatively low marginal costs are located in the flat section of the merit order curve. Note that wind and solar
electricity generation is quite volatile by the hour, while hydro generation is characterized only by seasonal
fluctuations. Like nuclear power plants, various types of coal power plants have a low level of generation
flexibility. Usually, renewables, hydro, nuclear and coal power plants are known as base‐load technologies.
Various type of gas and oil power plants have both high level of generation flexibility and marginal costs and, as
such, are known as peak‐load technologies.
15 ∆    ; ∆    
16 Bloom et al. (2013) also employ the same approach like Jaffe (1986) and construct firms technological
proximity and firms product market proximity measures to estimate R&D spillovers.
9() for each hour using specific information from the German and French merit-order 
curves17. Different generation technology classes 	 ∈ 1, 18 in Germany and France meet the 
corresponding demand curves in any given hour. We identify 70 different generation 
technology classes in Germany and France, and denote electricity generated by generation 
technology class  for hour  in Germany and France, respectively, by ,, and ,,. 
,  ∑ ,,  ,  is total electricity generation e.g. in Germany that meets demand 
, at a certain hour, . The vector ,,  ,,,  is the share of electricity generated by 
the generation technology class  over total electricity generation for a specific hour, , e.g. in 
Germany. The Jaffe index 
,, 
,,,,
,,,, /,,,, /
between German and French merit orders (i.e. supply curves) up to their intersection with their 
demand curves is our measure of generation mix similarity between Germany and France. 
,,,,  is the uncentered covariance between the shares of electricity generated by 
generation technology class () at a specific hour (). The advantage of ,, is that it 
normalizes the uncentered covariance on the standard deviations of the share vectors. As a 
result, ,, will not automatically rise when generation technology classes are 
aggregated.  ,, takes values between zero and one, with a value of zero indicating 
completely different generation mixes in Germany and France in a given hour, and a value of 
one indicating essentially the same employed technologies in that hour. From Graph 1, we 
expect that when ,, gets higher spot price spreads and the likelihood of congestion 
get lower. 
 Trade with other neighbouring countries 
 Standard literature on integration of electricity markets does not consider trade with 
third countries. Graph 2 exemplarily makes visible the impact of electricity trade between 
Germany and Denmark and between France and Italy on the integration of German and French 
electricity spot markets. 
[Graph 2] 
17 See the Appendix for information relating to the construction of both German and French merit‐orders.
18 E.g. hard coal, gas, oil, etc.
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A particular high share of renewables and other technologies with low marginal costs 
distinguishes the structure of the merit-order of the Danish (DK) and German (DE) electricity 
markets from the French (FR) and Italian (IT) markets. Therefore, in an assumed autarky 
scenario, Danish and German markets obviously meet their national demands at the lowest price 
followed by France and Italy (      ). According to trade theory, electricity 
flows from the low to the high price market area19. Hence, Germany exports electricity to 
France shifting both the German demand curve  (→) (dashed line) and the French 
supply curve  to the right (→) (dashed line). Accordingly, the equilibrium price in 
the French market decreases (   ) and in the German market it increases (   ). 
The two markets have one uniform electricity spot price (   ) in those hours with 
abundant interconnection capacities. 
If France exports electricity to Italy shifting both the French demand curve	
→ (dashed line) and the Italian supply curve  to the right → (dashed 
line), the equilibrium price in Italy decreases (   ) and in France it increases ( 
 )20. Note that these standard trade theory results imply that electricity exports from France 
to Italy have increased price spreads (   ) and the likelihood of congestion between 
Germany and France. Moreover, the likelihood of congestion is increased in the direction from 
Germany to France, but decreased from France to Germany21. 
Another illustration is Denmark. Denmark exports its abundant wind electricity to 
Germany shifting both the demand curve	 → (dashed line) and the supply 
curve	 → (dashed line). This leads to a price decrease in Germany (   ) 
and a price increase in Denmark (   ). The price decrease in Germany further increases 
price spreads to France22 and the likelihood of congestion. Moreover, the likelihood of 
congestion is increased in the direction from Germany to France, but decreased from France to 
Germany. 
Summarizing, in markets with increasing marginal cost (=supply) schedules and limited 
cross-border capacities (e.g. in electricity markets) cross-border externalities abound. For 
example, exporting from France to Italy and importing from Denmark to Germany increase 
19 See Baldwin & Wyplosz (2015) for a thorough discussion on open‐economy supply and demand curves.
20 Due to congested interconnection capacities, uniform prices between France and Italy are rarely observed.
21 France exports to Germany in 38% of the hours. Yet, French exports to Italy increase French spot prices and
hence spot price spreads between Germany and France and the likelihood of interconnection capacity
congestion from France to Germany decrease.
22         .
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spot price spreads and the likelihood of congestion between Germany and France. We also 
derive results on the direction of congestion. 
4. Data and variables 
The empirical analysis employs a very rich data set for the period from 01.04.2011 to 
31.12.2014. Hourly electricity spot prices are derived from the respective power exchanges: 
EPEX Spot for Germany and France and GME for Italy. We obtained very rich data relating to 
generation capacities by plant type and construction year for Germany and France from Platts 
Power Vision. The Energy Economics Group from TU Vienna and Austrian Power Grid (APG) 
have provided us with data relating to the availability of power plants and efficiency factors by 
plant type, turbine type and construction year. Among other sources, we combined these data 
sets to construct the merit orders for each hour in both German and French electricity markets. 
In the Appendix, we describe in detail the construction of the merit orders and the source of the 
employed data. 
 Hourly load data for Germany and France are obtained from ENTSO-E. Hourly day-
ahead forecasts for intermittent renewables (wind and solar) electricity generation in Germany 
for the period from 01.04.2011 to 31.12.2014 are obtained from the German TSO-s 
(TransnetBW, Tennet, 50hertz and Amprion) and the Austrian TSO, APG. French hourly day-
ahead wind forecasts for the period from 01.04.2011 to 31.12.2014 are obtained from the French 
TSO, RTE. RTE also provided us with hourly nuclear generation data from 01.04.2011 to 
31.12.2014. Hourly day-ahead forecasts for wind electricity in Denmark East and West are 
obtained from Energienet. Hourly data on available transfer capacities () and allocated 
capacities () between Germany and France and between France and Italy are obtained from 
the central office for cross-border transmission capacity for central Europe (CASC). 
Dependent variables. This study employs four different dependent variables and 
accordingly four regression equations. Absolute value of spot price spreads are defined 
as		,,  ,  ,. In order to obtain interconnection capacity congestion 
between Germany and France, ,,, we first compute the difference between available 
transfer capacities, ,,, and allocated capacities, ,,, and generate the variable 
available interconnection capacity, ,, 	 	,,	–	,,. If	,,  0, 
interconnection capacities are congested, while ,,  0 indicates free interconnection 
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capacities. The dummy variable ,,  equals one if ,,  0  indicating congestion 
(and zero else). 
 Since the data for ,, and ,, are available for both directions 
(→,, →, and →,, →,), we construct two variables to 
distinguish interconnection capacity congestion23 when electricity flows from Germany to 
France (→,) and from France to Germany (→,) are congested, respectively.  
Explanatory variables. This study employs the following explanatory variables: (1) 
generation mix similarity index of German and French electricity markets; (2) load in Germany 
and France; (3) nuclear generation in France; (3) wind and solar forecasts in Germany; (4) wind 
forecasts in France and Denmark; (5) interconnection capacity between Germany and France 
and between France and Italy24 and (7) day of the week, yearly and holiday dummies. Next, we 
make a detailed description of our explanatory variables and their expected effect on our 
dependent variables, ,,, ,,, →, and →,. 
Generation mix similarity index of German and French electricity markets, 
,,. Ceteris paribus, we expect a low (high) ,, (relatively dissimilar 
(similar) generation mix) to increase (decrease) interconnection congestion and spot price 
spreads. 
Loads in Germany and France, , and	,, are introduced to control for electricity 
demand on both sides of the border. Since France imports from Germany in the majority of 
hours between 2011 and 2014 (meaning	  ), we expect that an increase in demand for 
electricity in Germany increases the spot price in Germany and leads to lower spot price spreads 
to France. On the other hand, an increase in demand for electricity in France would further 
increase the spot price in France leading to higher spot price spreads. The same logic applies to 
interconnection capacity congestion: more load in Germany decreases congestion, more load in 
France increases congestion. 
23 The introduction of market coupling has enabled efficient allocation of interconnection capacities, and as a
result, high demand for interconnection capacity may lead to congestion of interconnection capacity, but
congestion can occur only in one direction if market coupling is in place (Gugler et al., 2016).
24 We introduced Denmark due to (1) a high share of capacities of wind electricity generation, (2) a constantly
decreasing number of congested hours with Germany and (3) availability of the data for a longer period. We
introduced Italy, since France has the highest interconnection capacities with Italy and it mostly exports to Italy.
We also have checked for interconnection capacities with Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.
The data for these countries are available for a shorter period and therefore we do not report the results. The
results are available upon request.
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Yet, the analysis of the impact of a demand increase in Germany and France with respect 
to the direction of interconnection capacity congestion is more subtle. When electricity flows 
from Germany to France, an increase in demand for electricity in Germany leads to higher 
German electricity spot prices and lower spot price spreads, ,,, which in turn 
decreases the likelihood that interconnection capacities from Germany to France are congested. 
This is because less electricity export is necessary to achieve price equality. Thus, more load in 
Germany is expected to decrease the likelihood of interconnection capacity congestion from 
Germany to France. On the other hand, an increase in demand for electricity in France increases 
spot prices in France and spot price spreads, and thus increases the likelihood of congestion of 
electricity flows from Germany to France, since more electricity export is necessary to complete 
price equality. Analogously, the respective opposite effects of an increase in demand for 
electricity in Germany and France are expected for congestion in the direction from France to 
Germany. 
Nuclear generation in France, ,, is introduced to control for the high amounts of 
nuclear generation in France. Since nuclear carries very low marginal costs, we expect that 
nuclear generation in France puts downward pressure on the spot price level in France and since 
France mostly imports from Germany also on spot price spreads, and on the likelihood of 
interconnection capacity congestion. Moreover, we expect that the likelihood of congested 
exports from Germany to France decreases. On the contrary, in the other direction from France 
to Germany, the likelihood of congestion increases. 
Wind and solar forecasts in Germany, and wind forecast in France and 
Denmark,	,, ,, , and ,, are introduced to control for huge amounts of wind 
and solar electricity generation in Germany and wind electricity in France and Denmark. Every 
additional MW of low cost electricity generation from renewables in Germany decreases the 
spot price in Germany further and thus increases spot price spreads to France and the likelihood 
of congestion of electricity flows from Germany to France. Hence, like Keppler et al. (2016), 
we expect that additional , and , increases price spreads between Germany and France 
(by decreasing German spot prices), since Germany is the net exporting market area. On the 
other hand, we expect that additional wind and solar electricity in Germany decreases the 
likelihood that electricity flows from France to Germany are congested, since less electricity 
exports are necessary to achieve price equality. Wind electricity in France,	,, is expected 
to have the opposite effect of wind electricity in Germany on price spreads and congestion. 
Wind electricity in Denmark, ,, is introduced in order to control for the impacts of 
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renewable policies in third countries and it is expected to have the same impact as wind 
electricity in Germany, since the number of hours with similar prices between Germany and 
Denmark (East and West) is very high and increasing over time25. 
Interconnection capacity between Germany and France, ,,, takes the values of 
→, when ,  , and of →, when ,  ,. Thus, ,,
measures interconnection capacity in  between Germany and France. It is intuitive to expect 
that an increase in interconnection capacity between Germany and France has a negative impact 
on spot price spreads and congestion. Note, that we do not include this variable in the direction 
of congestion equation, since interconnection capacity per se should not be a predictor in which 
direction congestion is likely to occur. 
Interconnection capacity between France and Italy,	,,, is constructed like 
interconnection capacity between Germany and France. As such, it measures interconnection 
capacity in  between France and Italy. In section 4, we presented the impacts of trade with 
third countries on market integration between two adjacent markets. Ceteris paribus, we expect 
that increasing interconnection capacity between France and Italy leads to an increase in spot 
price spreads,	,,, and in the likelihood of congestion of the interconnection 
capacities, ,,. This is likely to occur because France exports in about 90% of the hours 
to Italy, since electricity prices are higher in Italy. Thus, when more exports become possible, 
France exports more to Italy and French spot prices increase. This increases the price spread 
between France and Germany on average, since electricity prices are already higher in France. 
This logic also leads us to expect that larger interconnection capacities between France and 
Italy lead to a higher (lower) congestion likelihood of the Germany (France) to France 
(Germany) direction. Finally, we additionally employ seasonal fixed effects (day of week, 
yearly and holiday dummies) to capture seasonal demand variations. 
Table 1 and Table 2 show variable definitions, expected signs and the source of the data 
as well as all descriptive statistics, respectively. Wholesale spot prices are lower in Germany 
on average than in France (40.5 €/MWh versus 42.6 €/MWh). The average absolute spread is 
5.3 €/MWh. In 45% of hours interconnection capacities between Germany and France are 
congested. In 29% of hours congestion occurs in the Germany to France direction, in 16% in 
25 Graph 2 illustrates the impacts of exporting (low marginal cost) wind electricity from Denmark to Germany on
German and French price spreads.
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the other direction26. The average GMSI is 64.3%. Note, however, that GMSI nearly takes on 
values in the whole range between zero and one. Thus, there is huge variation in the similarity 
of generation mixes in Germany and France across hours. 
[Table 1] 
[Table 2]
Table 3 shows the developments of our dependent variables and ,, between 
2011 to 2014. It can be seen that in the year 2011 interconnection capacities were congested in 
38% of hours, 11% from Germany to France and 27% from France to Germany. The number 
hours with interconnection capacity congestion increased in the more recent years to around 
50%. Congestion probabilities particularly increased in the Germany to France direction (from 
11% in 2011 to 32% in 2014), reverting the pattern from 2011. Note that ,, has 
constantly decreased from 0.78 in 2011 to 0.59 in 2014, which means that generation 
technologies have become less similar in recent years. In the next section, we estimate the 
impacts of our variables on price spreads and on the likelihood of interconnection capacity 
congestion between Germany and France. 
[Table 3]
5. Empirical model 
First, we estimate the impacts of ,, and other control variables on the magnitude of 
spot price spreads between German and French electricity spot markets, 
,,    ,,  ,,  ,  ,
 ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,,
 ,,     ,
(1) 
 The subscript  indicates the frequency of observations (hour). Our dependent variable 
is ,,, which we define as the absolute value of the difference between the German 
26 Since the two markets are subject to market coupling (see also Gugler et al., 2016, Keppler et al., 2016), this
implies that the German price is lower than the French price in 29% of hours, the French price is lower than the
German price in 16% of hours and there is price equality in 55% of hours.
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and French spot electricity prices. The one hour lagged dependent variable is included to control 
for intraday demand and supply rigidities27. We employ a simple OLS estimator to estimate 
equation (1).  measures the impact of ,, on the price spread.  and  are load 
coefficients in Germany and France, respectively.  shows the impacts of nuclear generation 
in France on the price spread.  and  measure the impact of day-ahead forecasts of wind and 
solar electricity in Germany on the price spread, respectively.  is the coefficient for day-ahead 
forecasts for wind electricity in France.  shows the coefficient for day-ahead forecasts for 
wind electricity in Denmark.  measures the impact of interconnection capacity between 
Germany and France on the price spread.  is the coefficient for interconnection capacity 
between France and Italy. The vector  includes dummies for the day-of-week, year and 
holidays. 
 Second, we estimate the determinants of interconnection capacity congestion. We 
employ a logit model to estimate the impacts of our explanatory variables on the likelihood of 
interconnection capacity congestion between Germany and France. 
,,  1
   ,,  ,  ,  ,  ,
 ,  ,  ,  ,,  ,,  
 ,
(2) 
 In contrast to other empirical studies, in this study we distinguish between the directions 
of interconnection congestion. This is a very important issue, since not only the sizes of the 
coefficients but also their signs are expected to differ depending on the direction of 
interconnection congestion (see above). Therefore, we separate ,, into congested hours 
from Germany to France, →, (Equation (3)), and from France to Germany, →,
(Equation (4)): 
→,  1
   ,,  ,  ,  ,  ,
 ,  ,  ,  ,,    ,
(3) 
27 For example, most of the conventional power plants (nuclear and coal) cannot adjust their generation from
hour to hour over the day, e.g. due to fixed start‐up and ramping costs. When we exclude this variable, results
remain unchanged.
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→,  1
   ,,  ,  ,  ,  ,
 ,  ,  ,  ,,    ,
(4) 
 We expect opposite signs for the estimated parameters in Equation (3), 
, , , , , , 		 and Equation (4),	, , , , , , 			. 
6. Discussion of the main results 
 Table 4 shows the estimation results based on Equations (1)-(4). Equation (1) is 
estimated by OLS, whereas we estimate Equations (2)-(4) by logistic regression for which we 
report odds ratios.28 Like other studies, we assume that demand for electricity is exogenous, 
because of negligible short-term elasticity (for more information, see Borenstein (2009); Green 
& Newbery (1992)). Note that the lagged dependent variable introduced in Equation (1) does 
not imply inconsistency for very large time series data sets as we employ (see Keele & Kelly, 
2006). In any case, when we exclude it, all results hold up. All reported standard errors are 
robust to any form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation for all specifications. Most 
estimated coefficients and odds ratios are statistically significant and all have the expected sign. 
 Regarding Eq. (1) the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, ,,, is 
positive and highly significant meaning that there exist some persistent spreads stemming from 
intraday supply and demand rigidities. For example, nuclear and most of the conventional 
power plants might not be able or willing to adjust their supply according to demand from hour 
to hour over the day, e.g. due to fixed start-up and ramping costs. In addition, demand is mostly 
rigid over several hours over the day. 
[Table 4]
 The negative and statistically significant coefficient of ,, (Eq. (1)) indicates 
that more similar generation technologies in Germany and France decrease price spreads.29
28 Odds ratios give the probability of congestion of interconnection capacities compared to the probability of no
congestion. An odds ratio greater (smaller) than one implies a positive (negative) coefficient, since the coefficient
is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio.
29 We also have constructed a dummy variable that controls for marginal generation technologies in Germany
and France. It takes values of one in case of similar marginal generation technologies and zero otherwise. The
results are very similar to GMSI and are available upon request.
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Thus, a ,, of one implies that price spreads between Germany and France are almost 
eliminated30. In addition, from Eq. (2) we see that ,, has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on the likelihood of interconnection capacity congestion (,,). The 
odds ratio of 0.218 implies that if ,, increases by 0.1, the odds of interconnection 
capacity congestion are 78.2% lower (=1  0.218 ∗ 100). Ceteris paribus when ,,
approaches zero (completely dissimilar generation mixes) and one, respectively (completely 
similar generation mixes)31, the estimated predicted probabilities for congested interconnection 
capacities are around 69% and 32%, respectively. In line with our expectations, we see that 
convergence and integration of European electricity markets heavily depend on generation 
mixes of European electricity markets. 
 Consistently, more similar applied technologies in Germany and France lead to much 
lower congestion probabilities in the direction of Germany to France than from France to 
Germany. Both countries have similar supply structures mostly during peak times when both 
employ predominantly gas as the marginal technology. In these hours price spreads are mostly 
eliminated and lower exports from Germany to France imply that interconnection capacities are 
abundant. 
 Comparing estimated coefficients of Eq. (1) and odds ratios of Eq. (2), the expectation 
of negative and positive impacts of , and , is confirmed for both equations, 
respectively. On average German spot prices are lower than French spot prices (see Table 2), 
and as a result, when demand for electricity in Germany (France) increases electricity spot 
prices increase (decreases) as well and, thus, ,, becomes smaller (larger). This in 
turn means that high electricity demand in Germany (France) has a negative (positive) impact 
on the odds of interconnection capacity congestion on average. In terms of odds ratios, if 
, and , increase by 1, the odds that interconnection capacities become 
congested are 7.2% lower and 8.4% higher, respectively. This effect can be disentangled in 
larger odds of congestion in the Germany to France direction, and smaller odds of congestion 
in the France to Germany direction. Load in France has the exact opposite effects (see Eq. (3) 
and (4)). 
 As expected, electricity generation by wind in Germany increase price spreads and 
congestion, with the (expected) exception of equation (4). The same signs are obtained using 
30 The average price spread is 5.31 €/ (see Table 2). A move of ,,  0 to ,,  1
reduces price spreads by around 3.5 €/.
31 We estimate the predicted probabilities of interconnection capacity congestion for ,,  0 and
,,  1, by fixing other control variables at their means, using the Stata command
, ,,  0	1		 (see Torres‐Reyna, 2014).
19
solar generation in Germany, however, this variable is insignificant for price spreads. As 
expected, wind electricity in France has the exact opposite effects, while the magnitude of the 
coefficient and odds ratios is higher. Additional wind electricity may have such a large negative 
impact on both price spreads and congestion due to a high share of nuclear (low-cost) electricity 
generation in France. Wind electricity in Denmark also displays the same signs as wind and 
solar electricity in Germany, however, it is only significant for the congestion equations. The 
impact of nuclear generation in France on price spreads is as expected negative and significant. 
 Not surprisingly, an increase in own, i.e. German-French interconnection capacity 
,,, is associated with significantly lower price spreads as well as with lower odds of 
congestion. E.g., ceteris paribus, the predicted probabilities of congestion between Germany 
and France for the minimum and maximum interconnection capacity (,,) of 0	 and 
3.665	 (see Table 1) are around 89% and 17%, respectively. On the other hand, increasing 
interconnection capacity between France and Italy, ,,, increases both price spreads and 
the odds for interconnection capacity congestion between Germany and France. Since France 
mostly imports from Germany, exporting more electricity from France to Italy further increases 
the spot price level in France relative to the German spot price level and as more trade sets in 
capacity becomes more likely to be congested. Consistently, capacities become more congested 
in the direction from Germany to France and less in the direction from France to Germany. 
Hence, it seems that increasing interconnection capacities and, thus trade flows, between France 
and Italy play an important role for the degree of electricity market integration between 
Germany and France. Moreover, the direction of congestion is important. As mentioned above, 
this occurs because France mostly exports to Italy. When electricity flows from France to 
Germany and at the same time interconnection capacities between France and Italy together 
with trade increases, interconnection capacity congestion between Germany and France, 
→,, occurs less often. Thus, one can conjecture that ceteris paribus once French and 
Italian electricity spot markets become better integrated, integration of German and French 
electricity spot markets might suffer. E.g., ceteris paribus, the predicted probabilities of 
congestion between Germany and France (,,) for the minimum and maximum 
interconnection capacity between France and Italy of 0	 and 3.579	 (see Table 1), are 
around 40% and 66%, respectively. Thus, externalities matter a lot in electricity markets. 
 In sum, the main result of this study is that electricity spot price spreads are almost 
eliminated and the likelihood of interconnection capacity congestion is significantly reduced 
once both German and French electricity markets employ very similar generation mixes. Put 
differently, if German and French electricity generation mixes are very dissimilar, the 
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likelihood of congestion is largest. We further show that more interconnection capacity between 
France and Italy and more wind generation in Denmark positively affects both price spreads 
and the likelihood for interconnection capacity congestion between Germany and France.
Moreover, all standard predictions of trade theory in markets characterized by increasing 
marginal cost (=supply) and limited cross-border trade capacity are borne out by the data. 
Interdependencies and externalities clearly are main features of European electricity markets. 
7. Conclusion 
The European Commission has been constantly attempting to harmonise and integrate the 
historically independent national electricity systems in order to achieve an internal European 
electricity market. However, the absence of well-coordinated national energy policies across 
EU member states may distort developments toward an internal European electricity market. 
Integration of European national electricity markets necessitates interconnection capacity to 
make possible electricity flows from one market to another market. 
 This study investigates the impacts of similarities/differences in generation structures 
between German and French electricity markets on the electricity spot price spreads and on the 
likelihood of interconnection capacity congestion. We find that when German and French 
electricity markets employ similar generation technologies, electricity spot price spreads are 
almost eliminated, while the likelihood for interconnection capacity congestion significantly 
decreases.
What do these results imply in terms of convergence of European electricity markets? 
Our first main result is that at least part of the "convergence" that we witnessed in recent years, 
and which was documented in recent literature, is spurious. In other words, it is not (purely) 
driven by the forces of arbitrage but (also) by coincident similarities in the generation structures. 
We see zero price spreads only in those hours where it happened that generation mixes are fairly 
similar, e.g. because the marginal technologies were the same (e.g. gas or coal). In those hours 
prices converged and cross-border capacities were not exhausted between Germany and France. 
In those hours, however, where generation mixes are dissimilar, prices (still) diverge and cross-
border capacities are (still) exhausted between Germany and France. Two facts aggravate the 
problem. First, the benefits of cross-border trade and diversification of power generation (like 
less need for a capacity market) are largest exactly when the generation mixes are dissimilar, 
but in those hours congestion probabilities are largest. For example, Germany would profit most 
from an integrated market with France when the wind is strong in Northern Germany and much 
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excess electricity could be exported to France, as is the case when there is very little wind in 
Germany and France could export a lot of its nuclear electricity. However, in exactly those 
hours cross-border capacities are congested. Second, the average GMSI between Germany and 
France decreased in recent years from 0.78 in 2011 to 0.59 in 2014. Clearly, the large relative 
increase of renewables (wind and solar) and the unilateral phase out of nuclear energy in 
Germany in recent years made generation mixes more dissimilar compared to its neighbour 
France adding to the problem. Hence, the aim of integrating European electricity markets is to 
ensure access to a more diversified power plants’ portfolio, which in turn is expected to increase 
security of electricity supply and improve the reliability of the electricity system through 
reducing the cost of maintaining capacity adequacy. This study, however, shows that the more 
dissimilar generation mixes are the higher the likelihood that interconnection capacities become 
congested and, as a result, diversification effects cannot be obtained. Therefore, full price 
convergence and the benefits of diversification can only be achieved by additional investment 
in cross-border capacity. 
 In addition, we provide several other interesting and consistent results, all derived and 
embedded in standard trade theory. For example, not surprisingly, more interconnection 
capacity implies more integration (lower price spreads and lower likelihood of congestion). Put 
differently, integrating two diverse markets and realising the benefits of integration requires 
sufficient interconnection capacity investment, while integration of two relatively similar 
markets does not require high interconnection capacity investment (but of course, 
diversification effects are also lower). 
 Furthermore, price spreads and the likelihood of congestion between a pair of countries 
heavily depend on the influences of neighbouring countries in electricity. Wind electricity in 
Denmark affects the likelihood of congestion between Germany and France in the same way as 
own (i.e. German) wind electricity does. More interconnection capacity between France and 
Italy increases price spreads, increases congestion probabilities from Germany to France and 
reduces them from France to Germany, since France mostly imports from Germany but mostly 
exports to Italy. Our second main result therefore is that interdependencies and cross-border 
externalities abound in European electricity markets, and any sensible solutions to the main 
problems such as integration of renewables and security of supply cannot be achieved by purely 
national energy policies. 
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Table 1. Variables description, sources and expected signs
Expected sign
Variable Description Source ,, ,, →, →,
Dependent
,, Absolute value of spot price spreads between Germany andFrance, in €/ EPEX
,,
Derived from available transfer capacities and already allocated
capacities between Germany and France. It equals 1 for
congestion of interconnection capacities and zero otherwise
CASC
→, It equals one for congestion of interconnection capacities fromGermany to France and zero otherwise CASC
→, It equals one for congestion of interconnection capacities fromFrance to Germany and zero otherwise CASC
Explanatory
,, Measures the similarity of generation mix structures betweenGermany/Austria and France. It lies between zero and one. Several
a) (‐) (‐) (‐) (‐)
, Aggregate consumption in Germany, in ENTSO‐E (‐) (‐) (‐) (+)
, Aggregate consumption in France, in ENTSO‐E (+) (+) (+) (‐)
, Nuclear generation in France, in RTE (‐) (‐) (‐) (+)
, Forecasts for wind electricity generation in Germany, in  German TSOsb) (+) (+) (+) (‐)
, Forecasts for solar electricity generation in Germany, in  German TSOs (+) (+) (+) (‐)
, Forecasts for wind electricity generation in France, in  RTE (‐) (‐) (‐) (+)
, Forecasts for wind electricity generation in Denmark (sum ofwind generation in both East and West Denmark), in  Energienet (+) (+) (+) (‐)
,, Interconnection capacity between Germany and France, in  CASC, EPEX (‐) (‐)
,, Interconnection capacity between France and Italy, in  CASC, EPEX,GME (+) (+) (+) (‐)
a) Platts Power Vision, APG, RTE, TransnetBW, Tennet, 50hertz and Amprion, E-Control, EEG – TU Vienna, Energy Agency, EEX, BAFA (the German Federal Office of Economics and Export 
Control), U.S. Energy Information Administration 
b) APG, TransnetBW, Tennet, 50hertz and Amprion.
28
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
, 32888 40.46 16.22 ‐100.00 210.00
, 32894 42.65 18.57 ‐100.00 500.00
Dependent
,, 32879 5.31 9.90 0.00 380.00
,, 32904 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
→, 32904 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
→, 32904 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Explanatory
,, 32904 0.64 0.15 0.01 0.99
, 32904 62.38 11.79 34.48 89.94
, 32904 54.10 12.02 29.70 102.10
, 32904 46.21 6.33 14.25 61.04
, 32904 5.88 4.82 0.32 29.30
, 32904 3.23 5.00 0.00 24.50
, 32904 1.64 1.12 0.10 7.37
, 32904 1.26 1.00 0.00 4.89
,, 32904 2.21 0.58 0.00 3.67
,, 32904 0.74 0.72 0.00 3.58
Note: The data relating to load, nuclear, wind and solar forecast and interconnection capacities are in	. ,, is 
an index which by construction can take values between zero and one. ,, , and ,, are in €/. The 
rest of variables are dummies.
Table 3. Dependent variables and ,,, 2011‐2014
Direction 2011 2012 2013 2014
→, 11% 30% 42% 32%
→, 27% 7% 12% 17%
,, 38% 37% 53% 49%
,, 3.96 4.16 7.68 4.75
,, 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.59
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Table 4. Regression Coefficients (Eq. (1)) and Odds Ratios (Eq. (2), (3) and (4))
	 Eq.(1) Eq.(2) Eq.(3) Eq.(4),, ,, →, →,
,, 0.683 ***
(0.038)
,, ‐3.478 *** 0.218 *** 0.112 *** 0.365 ***
(0.735) (0.035) (0.023) (0.090)
, ‐0.121 *** 0.928 *** 0.873 *** 1.135 ***
(0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
, 0.201 *** 1.084 *** 1.275 *** 0.676 ***
(0.020) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
, ‐0.175 *** 0.986 *** 0.847 *** 1.396 ***
(0.020) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013)
, 0.073 *** 1.037 *** 1.218 *** 0.857 ***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
, 0.015 1.039 *** 1.105 *** 0.892 ***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
, ‐0.306 *** 0.858 *** 0.671 *** 1.923 ***
(0.047) (0.012) (0.012) (0.047)
, 0.024 1.067 *** 1.245 *** 0.915 ***
(0.044) (0.018) (0.025) (0.027)
,, ‐1.307 *** 0.375 ***
(0.129) (0.010)
,, 0.784 *** 1.338 *** 1.635 *** 0.587 ***
(0.087) (0.025) (0.039) (0.023)
 10.998 *** 35.928 *** 6.100 *** 0.017 ***
(1.149) (8.000) (1.681) (0.006)
___ Yes Yes Yes Yes
_ Yes Yes Yes Yes
_ Yes Yes Yes Yes
 32,872 32,904 32,904 32,904
   0.624
Note: Coefficients (for Eq. (2), (3) and (4)) can be obtained using the following formula: Coefficient = ln(	, 
e.g. the coefficient for , in Eq.(2) is   ln0.218  1.523. We get negative (positive) coefficients 
for odds ratios lower (greater) than one. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***   0.01, **   0.05, *   0.1.
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Appendix 
A fundamental model for calculating marginal costs 
We develop a state-of-the-art (standard) fundamental market model of electricity supply and 
demand in electricity generation, as applied in other studies (e.g. Borenstein and Bushnell,1999; 
Schröter, 2004; Sensfuß, 2007; Sensfuß et al., 2008; Burger et al., 2007, Chapter 4; Graf and 
Wozabal, 2013; Hirth, 2013) to identify generation technology classes that are in the merit 
order. Hence, we construct hourly supply curves (i.e. the merit order curve) by applying data 
on installed capacities and combine these with technical information on plant characteristics 
and other relevant data (e.g. plant availability scores and efficiency factors; see below). Hourly 
demand, on the other hand, is simply determined by hourly load in the market (net of cross-
border trade). The Austrian transmission system operator, Austrian Power Grid (APG), and the 
Energy Economics Group (EEG) of the Technical University of Vienna, both having developed 
their own fundamental models, provided us with background knowledge, modelling support, 
and information. 
Trading in wholesale electricity in Europe happens to a large extend at day-ahead spot markets, 
which are organized at power exchanges. In a power exchange, suppliers and consumers place 
bids (e.g. EPEX at 12 a.m.) for any hour of the following day. Such power exchanges are 
generally characterized by many suppliers and consumers and have high liquidity (Gugler et 
al., 2016). According to Graf and Wozabal (2013), firms bid their capacities at marginal costs 
at the EPEX day-ahead market and thus the market worked efficiently. In our case, this is 
necessary to determine which generation technology classes are in the merit order. That is, firms 
will only generate electricity from their owned technology capacity if its marginal costs of 
producing are below the spot price. Therefore, we calculate hourly marginal costs of each 
generation technology class in order to construct hourly merit orders. 
Data 
We obtain detailed information on installed capacity () at the generation unit level for the 
period 2011–2014 from Platts PowerVision. The following information is obtained on 
generation unit level: plant name, construction and retire date, turbine type, fuel type, plant 
type, operational status, and installed capacity (in MW). In contrast to other sources like 
Bundesnetzagentur (2011) that publishes a list of German power plants with installed capacities 
larger than 20 MW, Platts PowerVision provides data for all European countries irrespective of 
the size. 
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APG provided us with information on availability factors () of power plants turbine and fuel 
type. The availability of a power plant is an operational limitation determined, for example, by 
planned revisions (e.g. maintenances) and seasonal demand fluctuations. In accordance with 
Schröter (2004), we consider three periods: winter season, summer season and transition phase, 
in order to adjust our availability measure to seasonal demand fluctuations. Low electricity 
demand during summertime allows for higher operational flexibility. Thus, most of the planned 
revisions take place during summer, so that our availability measure is significantly lower 
during this period. Our availability measure represents a percentage number (i.e. values 
between zero and one). With respect to renewables, we utilize hourly data on wind and solar 
forecasts (provided by the respective transmission system operators) to assess their 
availabilities. Bids at day-ahead markets generally follow wind and solar generation forecasts 
based on wind and sunshine forecasts. Biogas power plants are considered a renewable source 
of electricity and receive fixed rates for their generation, and thus generate a constant power 
output (Graf and Wozabal, 2013). Eventually, we multiply the respective installed capacity with 
the availability score of each plant type to create a measure of available capacity. 
APG and Energy Economics Group of TU Vienna (internal power plant database) provided us 
with information on the efficiency factors () of power plants by fuel and turbine type. The 
efficiency factor shows the relationship between energy input in terms of primary energy and 
energy output in terms of electricity. In our model, the efficiency factor of each generation unit 
is a function of turbine type, fuel type, and construction year (see Graf and Wozabal, 2013; 
Schröter, 2004; Sensfuß et al., 2008). The variable takes up values between zero and one. 
Construction of marginal costs, and electricity generated by generation technology classes 
Next, we calculate marginal costs for each hour () and by 70 generation technology classes 
(which are a combination of turbine type, fuel type, and construction year). For this purpose, 
we take fuel prices, the carbon dioxide (CO2) price, emission factors, and efficiency factors into 
consideration. Even though data on various measures do not vary by hour (e.g. daily), we 
impute these values for each hour (h). 
,  ,,, 
,  2,  2
,,
where: 
 = Marginal cost (€/MWh) 
  = Generation technology class 
 = Fuel price (€/MWh) 
 = Efficiency factor (%)
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2  = CO2 emission factor (tCO2/MWh) 
2  = CO2 spot price (€/MWh) 
  = Turbine type (steam turbine, combined cycle, etc.) 
  = Fuel type (hard coal, gas, oil, etc.) 
  = Construction year 
 = Hour 
We distinguish between 22 plant types, which are combinations of 12 turbine types and 12 fuel 
types. For these plant types, we collected data on their efficiency factors (EF) depending on 
their respective construction years, which gives us 70 different combinations. The idea is that 
older plants are less efficient and, thus, have higher marginal costs. Moreover, we collected 
data on fuel prices (FP) depending on the 12 fuel types over time. As the daily price of coal, 
we use ARA month future data provided by EEX. For gas, we use the daily price data provided 
by BAFA (the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control). As there is no spot 
market for lignite and consequently no price information available, in accordance with Graf and 
Wozabal (2013) we assume the lignite price to be 80% of the coal price. As the daily price of 
oil we utilize Europe Brent Spot FOB provided by U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
Given missing uranium prices for nuclear power, like Graf and Wozabal (2013) we assume a 
constant (and negligible) input price of USD 9.33 per MWh (see OECD/IEA, 2010). 
Furthermore, we collected data on the degrees of CO2 emissions by fuel type, which gives us 
the CO2 emission factors (CO2E). The respective information was provided by APG. We utilize 
data on daily CO2 spot prices from the European Energy Exchange (EEX). 
Next, we obtain electricity generation for each generation technology class  that are in the 
German and French merit orders for hour  (up to their intersection with their demand curves). 
Our availability factors () (i.e. a percentage score of total installed capacity) vary across 22 
plant types and across three seasons of the year (i.e. summer, winter, and transition period). To 
obtain electricity generated by generation technology class in Germany and France 
(,,	and	,,), we multiply generation technology classes’ installed capacities () with 
their respective availability factors (). 
,,  	,,  , and ,,  	,,  ,
where: 
  = Electricity generated (MWh) 
  = Installed capacity (MW) 
  = Availability factor (%) 
